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Abstract. Nowadays, fog computing is emerged for providing computational 
power closer to the users. Fog computing brings real-time processing, low-
latency, geo-distributed and etc. Although, fog computing do not come to 
compete cloud computing, it comes to collaborate. Recently, Fog-To-Cloud 
(F2C) continuum system is introduced to provide hierarchical computing system 
and facilitates fog-cloud collaboration. This F2C continuum system might 
encounter security issues and challenges due to their hierarchical and distributed 
nature. In this paper, we analyze attacks in different layer of F2C system and 
identify most potential security requirements and challenges for the F2C 
continuum system. Finally, we introduce the most remarkable efforts and trends 
for bringing secure F2C system. 
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1 Introduction : Combining Fog and Cloud 
Nowadays, the wide and continuous deployment of smart devices at the edge, such as 
sensors, actuators, smartphones, tablets, etc., setting the roots for the emerging Internet 
of Things (IoT) [1] paradigm, along with the recent developments in network 
technologies, from the network core (e.g., elastic or flexible optical networks) up to the 
user edge (e.g., LoRa), with an eye on the promising 5G, all enabling fast users and 
(even more important) Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication [2] are, all in all, 
paving the way towards an innovative but also unforeseen scenario where devices, 
users, services and also data will interact in a, more than probably disruptive way. 
Aligned to this evolution, cloud computing [3] has been widely adopted to address some 
of the key concerns related to data, including aggregation, processing and storage 
leveraging the large capacity massive data centers located at cloud are endowed with.  
Unfortunately, the far distance from the datacenters at cloud to the users and/or devices 
requiring the cloud services, brings undesired concerns –in terms of for example 
scalability, security or quality of service (QoS), just to name a few–, that may become 
critical challenges for some applications, for instance applications demanding real-time 
processing. Recognized this weakness, a new computing paradigm, fog computing [4], 
recently came up, and intended to sort this weakness out by moving cloud capacities 
closer to the edge. To that end, nodes with some computing capacities are distributed 
close to users and devices at the edge, referred to as fog nodes [5], thus facilitating real-
time processing and low-latency guarantees. Interestingly, fog computing does not 
compete with cloud computing, rather they both complement each other to guarantee a 
service to be allocated to those resources best suiting its demands. Thus, a new scenario 
comes up, built upon considering the whole set of resources from the edge up to the 
cloud, coined as IoT continuum [6], [7].  
A key challenge in this combined scenario refers to resources management assuming 
the specific requirements coming when considering the heterogeneous set of potential 
resources at the edge. Some ongoing efforts are already addressing this challenge, such 
as the OpenFog Consortium [8] or the EU mF2C project [9], the latter aimed at 
designing and developing the Fog-to-Cloud (F2C) concept proposed in [10], and both 
aimed at optimizing services execution and resource utilization. Recognized the 
potential benefits brought in by such optimization, a key and highly critical component 
refers to security provisioning. Indeed, there is no doubt that the edge context, putting 
together low control, low power, and generally speaking, considering a vast set of 
heterogeneous devices on-the-move, is highly vulnerable to attacks and security 
breaches that may put the whole system at risk. Therefore, it seems reasonable to devote 
some efforts to analyze and characterize what security provisioning means, what the 
challenges are and how could be addressed.  
To that end, this paper illustrates the particular scenario built by the F2C approach, as 
a potential candidate to the final optimization objective, although certainly the analysis 
performed in the paper might be adopted for any solution aligned to a decentralized 
architecture for combined fog and cloud systems. Indeed, F2C is proposed as a 
hierarchical multi-layered control architecture designed to manage the whole stack of 
resources from the very edge up to the cloud in a coordinated way, putting together the 
advantages of both computing paradigms, i.e., proximity at the fog and high 
performance at the cloud. 
From an organizational perspective, the combined F2C ecosystem is organized into 
areas, each including its whole set of resources (fog nodes and IoT devices) see Figure 
1 –the exact scope of an area and the individual allocation of resources into each area 
are ongoing research topics, certainly affecting the scalability of the system, but out of 
the scope of this paper. One node at each area is selected to serve as the fog leader 
(policies yet to be defined), thus responsible for managing the devices inside the area 
as well as coordinating with higher hierarchical layers. The set of fog leaders are also 
connected through a higher layer, thus setting the envisioned multi-layered hierarchical 
control architecture (see Figure 1 as a topological example, where fog leaders are 
connected through cloud).  
However, as briefly introduced above, this highly distributed and heterogeneous 
scenario fuels many security gaps and weaknesses that must be properly addressed. 
Certainly, it is worth emphasizing that most of the IoT devices included in the different 
areas will have low computational power and consequently, will not be able to handle 
their own security, nor support any highly demanding external security solution either. 
In fact, the scenario is not promising, since neither cloud computing (as a centralized 
strategy located far from the devices to secure) nor fog computing (using fog node 
resources to support security functionalities may have a non-negligible impact on the 
individual fog node QoS performance) seem to be the proper solution to provide the 
expected security guarantees. Moreover, beyond specific security provisioning 
limitations in IoT devices, any combined F2C-like system might impose additional 
security requirements due to its distributed, decentralized and layered nature, thus 
making security provisioning even more challenging.  
With the aim of illustrating the security concerns in combined F2C-like systems, this 
paper analyzes main security requirements and challenges for such scenario, with 
particular focus, for the sake of illustration, on the F2C approach. 
                           
                                                         Figure. 1. Combined F2C system 
 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we identify security requirements in 
combined F2C systems. Then, section 3 discusses and analyzes security challenges and 
provides some directions to move forward and section 4 illustrates some existing efforts 
and trend to provide F2C security.  Finally, section 5 concludes the paper. 
2 Security Requirements for F2C-like Systems 
A mandatory step previous to a potentially successful design of a security solution for 
combined fog and cloud systems boils down to identifying the particular set of security 
requirements demanded by such scenario. Contributions led by the OpenFog 
Consortium and the mF2C project, are currently trying to set the roots for such a 
definition. This section, focuses on the latter, considering the F2C architecture as an 
illustrative and sound approach for combined fog and cloud systems –although the 
security characteristics described in this paper should accommodate needs for any other 
F2C-like system. Moreover, it is worth highlighting that, from the design perspective, 
whatever the solution to be proposed is, it should benefit from recent technology 
innovations to improve or facilitate security provisioning. In this direction, just as an 
example, [11] briefly introduces potential benefits from adopting blockchain to security 
provisioning in fog systems. 
Before digging into the set of security requirements, we first summarize the whole 
distributed security procedure as proposed for the F2C layered architecture, describing 
specific steps for each one of the two envisioned domains and then we introduce 
potential attacks a F2C-like system may deal with. 
 
2.1 Security process in F2C  
As shown in Figure 1, F2C proposes a distributed and layered architecture where 
devices closer to the edge are clustered into different Fog Areas, each managed by a 
Fog Leader, logically located at an upper layer. Certainly, Fog Leaders enable both 
area-to-area and area-to-cloud connectivity, hence consequently a secure 
communication on two domains, fog-cloud and device-fog, is a must to avoid any 
passive or active attack.  
On the first domain, i.e., fog-cloud, some steps are needed to bring security in, as 
illustrated in Figure 2. More specifically, we may consider that first, each fog leader 
must be securely discovered and then perform mutual authentication with cloud through 
some credentials and identities, in order to provide system and data integrity and 
confidentiality. Once authenticated, fog leaders either generate keys, or get keys from 
cloud if key generation is not enabled at fog leaders. Fog leaders can then use these 
keys to encrypt and decrypt the information flow with cloud, aimed at preventing 
attackers to eavesdropping, modifying, or deleting information between cloud and fogs. 
From a technology view, the network technologies supporting cloud and fog leader 
communications (e.g., wired, wireless, etc.) must be secured to avoid passive and active 
attacks, turning into secure channels (blue lines in Figure 2.a).  
Once the fog leaders are properly installed and authenticated to the F2C cloud, they are 
authorized to provide computation, network, storage, and shareable computational 
environment to fog nodes and IoT devices at the edge of the network in a distributed 
way. Thus, the second domain, i.e., device-fog, as illustrated in Figure 2.b, starts when 
a device reaches out to a fog area, demanding the device to be discovered by a fog 
leader in a secure way. Then, as done for the first domain, fog leaders and devices must 
be mutually authenticated through some credentials in order to guarantee data and 
system integrity and confidentiality at the edge of the network. Once authenticated, 
devices either generate keys or get keys from the fog leaders, in case they cannot 
generate keys, to be used for encryption and decryption. The information flow between 
devices (IoT devices and fog nodes) and fog leaders must be properly encrypted to 
prevent attackers from eavesdropping, modify, or delete the information. Similarly, all 
information must be conveyed through secure channels regardless the deployed 
technology (blue lines in Figure 2.b).  
    
It is worth highlighting that in the first domain, cloud acts as access control providing 
the access to cloud data centers for the distributed fog leaders, according to their 
attributes and thus preventing any unauthorized access, while in the second domain, 
fog nodes are responsible for such task, preventing any unauthorized access to the F2C 
system at the edge of the network. 
The F2C scenario described so far may be more complex if mobility is also considered. 
More specifically, whatever the security strategy proposed is, the effects of the 
handover process triggered by a device on the move leaving one area (i.e. a fog leader) 
and getting into another one must be considered. This shift may drive the need for both 
areas to communicate each other to facilitate the handover process. Two options come 
up, one through cloud and the other one enabling horizontal communication among fog 
leaders. For the sake of processing time we may assume the latter to be the optimal one, 
hence demanding direct secure inter-communication between fog leaders.  
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Figure. 2. (a) Fog-cloud domain security; (b) Device-fog layer security 
 
2.2 Attacking a F2C system  
Unfortunately, there are many potential security vulnerabilities in F2C-like systems, 
paving the way for attackers to launch attacks in different layers in the system. In this 
section, we identify most potential attacks to be faced by F2C-like systems as illustrated 
in Figure 3, all grouped into three categories, as follows.   
Man-in-the-middle attack: Attackers can take the network control between devices at 
different levels (IoT devices, fog nodes, fog leaders and cloud) to either eavesdrop 
communication, modify information or even to inject malicious information and code 
into the system. For example, attackers can obtain the identity of a F2C component and 
then impersonate it to be an eligible component. Due to the obtained identity, the 
attacker can impersonate a fog leader (malicious fog leader) thus getting devices and 
users information and locations. Also, an attacker can impersonate users and devices to 
take information or gain access to services it is not authorized to. In upper layers, i.e. 
fog-cloud communication, an attacker can impersonate fog leader or even cloud to 
launch a man-in-the-middle attack. In all these cases, attackers can launch the attack in 
passive (eavesdropping without changing information) and active (information 
modification, manipulation and malicious injection) ways. This type of attack effects 
the integrity and confidentiality of any F2C-like system (see Figure 3.A). 
Denial of service and Distributed denial of service (DoS and DDoS): In this case, 
attackers either launch multiple service requests to the fog leader or perform a jamming 
wireless communication between fog leader-devices to deplete the fog leader resources 
and consequently making it down. An attacker can use legitimate devices, such as IoT 
devices, fog devices or fog leaders to launch DoS and DDoS using their identities. DoS 
and DDoS attacks can also occur in upper layers such as fog leader-cloud. As a 
consequence, attackers successfully prevent legitimate users and devices from 
accessing services provided by a fog leader or even by cloud (see Figure 3.B). In short, 
this attack severely affects the availability of the F2C system. 
Database attacks: In a F2C system, databases may meet a hierarchical architecture, 
keeping for example one centralized at cloud and some other locally distributed at fog 
layers. If an attacker can access to these databases, it can modify, manipulate and even 
leak the data, what may have a high impact on the total system performance. Database 
attacks may be internal –coming from F2C service providers–, or external –legible and 
illegible users. This attack intensely effects the F2C integrity and confidentiality (see 
Figure. 3C). 
 
2.3  Security Requirements in F2C  
After describing the main scenario characteristics for combined fog-cloud systems, the 
security strategy for F2C and the set of potential attacks a F2C system may suffer from, 
next, potential security requirements for combined fog-cloud systems are introduced in 
Table 1 (see also [12-13] for more information), summarized into 9 main concepts, all 
in all driving a set of challenges, as introduced in next section, fueling novel research 
avenues. It is worth mentioning that despite the fact that the identified security 
requirements are not novel in their conception, what makes them specially challenging 
is the specific scenario security is to be designed for, i.e., F2C-like systems, where 
heterogeneity, volatility and dynamics are basic and undeniable characteristics. 
Table 1. Combined F2C system security requirements 
Security requirements 




authorization at the 
whole set of layers 
Authentication must be done for all participant components in F2C 
systems to provide integrity and secure communication. A 
hierarchical authentication may be considered, in short, cloud 
authenticates fog leaders, and fog leaders authenticate edge devices 
(fog nodes and IoT devices). 
Appropriate key 
management strategy 
F2C systems must include a well-defined key management strategy 
for keys distribution and update as well as for key revocation. 
Access control policies 
to reduce intrusions 
Access control must be supported at cloud level and distributed 
access controls at fog layers 
 




availability (the CIA 
triad) as a widely 
adopted criteria for 
security assessment 
In a F2C system, user’s information must stay private not to be 
disclosed to unauthorized users (confidentiality), information must 
be complete, trustworthy and authentic (integrity), and finally the 
whole system must work properly, reacting to any disruption, 
failure or attack (availability). 
All network 
infrastructure must be 
secure 
All components in a F2C system (users, devices, fog leaders, fog 
nodes, and cloud) must communicate through secure channels 
regardless the specific network technology used to connect (wired, 
Bluetooth, wireless, ZigBee, etc.). 
All components must 
be trustable 
In the proposed hierarchical approach, the set of distributed fog 
leaders act as a key architectural pillar enabling data aggregation, 
filtering, and storing closer to the users, hence making trustness 
mandatory for fog leaders. 
Data privacy is a must 
Data processing, aggregation, communication and storage must be 
deployed not to disclose any private information, or produce data 
leakage, data eavesdropping, data modifications, etc. To that end, 
data must be encrypted, and data access must not be allowed to 
unauthorized users. Moreover, assuming mobility a key bastion in 
F2C systems other particular privacy related issues come up, such 
as for example geo-location. 
Preventing fake 
services and resources 
Fake scenarios are highly malicious in F2C systems, hence some 
actions must be taken to prevent that to happen, such as services 
and resources must be discovered and identified correctly and 
services and resources allocation must be done securely. 
Removing any potential 
mobility impact on 
security 
Fog nodes and IoT devices might be on the move, thus demanding 
the design of secure procedures to handle mobility related issues, 
such as devices handover. 
 
3 Open Challenges 
This section, driven by the set of security attacks and requirements identified in section 
2, is intended to go deep into the open challenges coming from the requirements above 
and necessary to provide security guarantees in a scenario combining fog and cloud 
computing. For the sake of understanding, the F2C approach is used to illustrate the 
specific details brought in when combining fog and cloud that make security 
provisioning even more challenging. In fact, the objective is not only to identify the 
challenges but also to highlight the open issues making them so challenging. To that 
end, challenges are split into 5 security concepts as shown in Table 2, aligned to and 
extending previous works in the area of fog computing.  
3.1 Trust and authentication:  
Trust: Traditional strategies applied to static or well defined scenarios do not match 
the particularities rolled in by the potential stack of heterogeneous and largely 
distributed resources considered in F2C systems. Working on that direction, the Open 
fog consortium [8] proposes to embed the hardware root of trust into the fog nodes to 
provide security at the IoT layer. Certainly, this is still an ongoing effort where many 
challenges remain yet unsolved, such a potentially unaffordable cost or to what extent 
an attack on a fog node may compromise the security for its IoT devices. In the same 
direction, a joint effort within the mF2C project is analyzing a blockchain-based 
solution to provide a novel distributed trust strategy particularly tailored to face the 
specific trust needs and conditions of combined fog and cloud systems. 
Authentication: Authentication is a key security component in any ICT system, but it 
is particularly important in scenarios where mobility and heterogeneity are undeniable 
characteristics. It is widely accepted that the use of the conceptually centralized cloud 
for handling device’s and user’s authentication cannot be sufficient for a F2C system. 
The reason for that is twofold. First, the huge number of messages forwarded between 
a large set of unstoppable increasing devices at the edge and cloud. Second, if cloud is 
down, compromised or attacked, the whole F2C system will be compromised. 
Fortunately, a solution based on the proposed hierachical layered architecture may be 
proposed. The main rationale for this proposal is that cloud can be used to authenticate 
fog leaders, and then, the authenticated fog leaders can handle IoT devices’, fog nodes’, 
and users’ authentication in their area in a distributed fashion. This solution would 
reduce cloud dependencies, would facilitate redundancy at fog layers to deal with 
potential fog node breaches and promises to be scalable (per layer). However, the work 
is not completely done and there are some questions yet to be solved. Indeed, a key 
question refers to “how can these hierarchical authentication processes be done and 
which type of authentication for each layer can be used”.  
Key management: Scalability is also a non-negligible drawback when considering a 
centralized key generator center (KGC) in combined fog and cloud systems. Indeed, 
beyond the effects of compromising the KGC, a large number of messages would be 
expected. Although a distributed key management strategy for generating, assigning, 
updating and revoking keys seems to be the proper approach, many open questions 
come up, mainly referring to: 
 How can IoT devices (in a large number and with low computational power) get 
keys to encrypt data?  
 Would it be possible fog layers to handle distributed key management for both IoT 
devices and users? 
 Would it be reasonable to assume cloud to act as key manager for fog layers and 
so the latter as distributed key managers for their areas? And if so, what should be 
the proper key management algorithm (symmetric or asymmetric) for each F2C 
layer?  
Identity management: The main aim is to assign an ID to all devices, what is pretty 
challenging for devices with low computational power, since ID storage might be not 
affordable. Indeed, some questions come up: 
 How can distributed IDs manager in fog layer be secured? 
 Would ID fragmentation be a candidate solution to minimize scalability issues? 
(i.e., using different fragment’s size for each layer [14])  
 If so, what would the right fragmentation policy to support an optimal fragment 
storage?  
 And what is the max/min fragment size allowed per layer? 
3.2  Access control and detection:  
Access control: Considering the large set of devices at the edge as well as the different 
characteristics shown by the whole set of resources in the continuum from the edge up 
to the cloud, the key question may be stated as “how to design a global access control, 
supporting the different systems characteristics and constraints”. The hierarchical 
model envisioned by the F2C model addresses this challenge proposing a hierarchical 
access control, deploying distributed access controls located at fog layers responsible 
for controlling devices and users at the edge of the network, and a centralized access 
control located at cloud layer responsible for controlling the distinct fog leaders. This 
may be a tentative solution that is currently being developed within the mF2C project.  
Intrusion detection mechanism: Deploying a centralized intrusion detection solution 
managing the envisioned huge number of participant devices in F2C systems brings 
many weaknesses, for example malicious activities or nodes might not be detected due 
to either the huge volume of traffic analysis, or the centralized approach it self. Indeed, 
whether a centralized intrusion detector collapse or it is compromised, the whole 
intrusion detection solution may fail, what would not be sane for the system.  
Malicious IoT and fog device detection: Recognized the fact that the near to the edge 
a system is the more is its level of vulnerability as well, the massive deployment number 
of devices at the edge of the network facilitates attackers to successfully launch attacks 
or faking devices to eavesdrop the system. Obviously, if a device gets compromised or 
attacked, it must be properly detected and rapidly revoked from the system. Thus, the 
challenging question is “how can malicious devices in different layers be detected and 
what strategy or algorithm can be used to detect the malicious device on real-time 
processing and revoke them?”.  
3.3 Privacy & sharing:  
Privacy: Data anonymization and data privacy are crucial components to protect user’s 
private information. However, in scenarios where data is a must, notably leveraging 
data collection and processing to offer innovative services, a key challenge may be 
stated as “which data anonymization can be applied to the the combined F2C scenario 
to keep the suitable trade-off between privacy and data utilization?” A tentative solution 
suggested for F2C systems may rely on keeping data as close to the edge as possible. 
To that end, fog leaders closer to users will take over the data processing, analysis and 
storage thus removing the need to go to higher lavers in the hierarchy, consequently 
reducing the privacy gap. Another recently relevant concern refers to mobility aspects. 
Indeed, there are many services and apps demanding user’s location to be executed, but 
the system should include strategies for users not willing to disclose their location. 
Indeed, some negotiation may be deployed between security and privacy, normally the 
more the security levels the lower the privacy guarantees and vice-versa. In fact, when 
an attack is detected, the system must be able to react and consequently should be able 
to find out attacker’s location. In short, privacy must be analyzed at different layers, 
privacy concerns must be identified, and finally, data and location privacy must be 
applied appropriately without impacting the whole security.  
Secure sharing computation and environment: In the envisioned combined model, 
resource sharing is an instrumental concept to move research but also market 
opportunities forward. In this sharing scenario fog nodes may complement IoT devices 
with low computational power, with additional resources. Although conceptually, this 
looks to be a promising model, attackers may benefit from it and may fake themselves 
as legible devices (as IoT devices, as fog nodes, and as fog leaders) to launch passive 
and active attacks. Three main relevant challenges come up: first, “how can a fog node 
or fog leader share their resources in a secure way with low computational power 
devices?”; second “how can IoT devices trust fog nodes?”; and third “how can IoT 
devices outsource their service execution to fog nodes they share resources with?”. 
Trust establishment and the ability to distinguish between legible and illegible devices 
is paramount here. Therefore, threat models and security analysis for the hierarchical 
shareable F2C environment must be done in each layer at an early stage, and all needed 
security requirements such as authentication, privacy, etc. must be provided before any 
device share their computational power with the system.  
3.4 End-to-end security solution:  
Network security: Interestingly, when moving close to the edge many different 
network technologies may be deployed, such as wireless, wired, zigbee, bluetooth, etc., 
that along with the candidate technologies to connect the edge to the cloud build a 
highly diverse technological scenario. Then, the main aim is to develop a network 
security strategy ensuring end-to-end security guarantees regardless the network 
technologies in place. It must be also considered that network technologies are not 
working in an isolated paradigm, rather different security protocols for different 
technologies might impact each other. Certainly, network technologies diversity is not 
a new problem and as said above, connectivity to cloud is agnostic of the technology 
used to connect. However, the single point failure concern and the long distance 
between the edge to cloud do not make cloud approach sound for the envisioned 
scenario. Therefore, network security must be re-designed to handle all type of network 
technologies, to provide end-to-end security, and to avoid the negative impact of 
handling different technologies and protocols.  
Quality of service (QoS): Service execution in combined fog and cloud scenarios must 
be supported by an optimal resource allocation, regardless where the resource is, as 
long as it perfectly meets service requirements, all in all to provide the expected QoS. 
However, whatever component is added for security provisioning some resources will 
be consumed, thus affecting the delivered QoS. The main rational behind this 
assessment seats in the huge volume of computational crypto requirements needed 
when implementing security. The services to be delivered through a combined fog and 
cloud deployment must positively benefit from such a resources combination in terms 
of a much better QoS while keeping solid levels of security on the whole stack of 
resources. Thus, to make it happen some open issues must be solved first, such as “if 
the distributed fog leaders take over security provisioning at the edge devices would 
they still have room to meet the expected QoS?, or in other words, “how do both 
security and QoS meet expected performance in combined F2C systems?”  
Heterogeneity: An F2C system is expected to manage heterogeneity at distinct levels, 
from network technologies, hardware or infrastructure providers, the latter being 
particularly interesting in terms of interoperability and also on a business oriented 
perspective. In fact, the envisioned F2C scenario should deal with distinct cloud 
providers (as already managed by the cloud sector) and also with fog providers. 
Certainly, what a fog provider may be is yet requiring sometime in the market, but it 
reasonable to consider cities, communities, malls, that is, “groups” of users that may 
become a “fog” provider for other users. In this scenario when providers become 
volatile (beyond the resources), setting agreements and “reliable” connections become 
a very challenging task. Consequently, a strategy should be sought to analyze how the 
different security strategies can be applied by the different providers, how they all can 
be compatible with each other and how the agreements may be set among them.  
Secure visualization: Interestingly, in a combined F2C system, fog nodes and fog 
leaders provide virtualization closer to the end users. The fog nodes and leaders might 
host the virtualization environment in their hypervisor. It means that, should the 
hypervisor gets attacked, then the whole fog’s virtualization environment might be 
compromised. Recognized the high vulnerability inherent to virtualization 
environments, in terms of virtualization attacks, such as virtual machine scape, 
hypervisor attacks, etc. Therefore, virtualization must implement in a secure way in the 
hierarchical F2C system.  
Monitoring: The vast amount of devices distributed at the edge of the network, makes 
a centralized monitoring at cloud not adequate enough for F2C systems. The 
challenging questions are “which monitoring strategy/ies must be deployed to correctly 
monitor the huge amount of distributed devices located at different stack layers?”, and 
“how the huge traffic analysis should be managed to detect malicious activities?” To 
that end, the solution pushed for by the mF2C project considers a distributed monitoring 
strategy implemented at fog layers to detect any malicious or abnormal behavior at the 
edge of the network, combined with a centralized monitoring strategy located at cloud 
for fog layers. 
Security management: The main challenges and questions here are, “can cloud as a 
centralized concept be sufficient to act as a security manager for the whole hierarchical 
F2C system?” The answer to this question is no, cloud as a centralized point failed to 
provide security and prevent several appeared attacks in past decades, although another 
challenge is, “What security management strategy must be taken into account for the 
distributed fogs and IoT devices?” To tackle with all these challenges, a new security 
management strategy, such as distributed security manager at fog layers and centralized 
at cloud, can be a suitable for the current security management for the F2C system. 
Centralized vs distributed security management: The key question refers to the 
capacity cloud as a centralized approach may have to serve as the security provider for 
the whole hierarchical F2C system. In fact, the correct answer is not positive since many 
reported attacks already exploited the cloud security vulnerabilities. Beyond that, the 
distributed nature of the F2C scenario, enriched with aspects related to mobility, 
volatility and heterogeneity make a centralized approach not to be the proper solution. 
Then, a distributed solution should be designed to handle the hierarchical nature of the 
F2C system, simultaneously handling the required security for distributed devices at 
the edge. 
Secure devices bootstrapping: All components in the combined F2C system must 
bootstrap in a secure way by getting public and private parameters. In this scenario, the 
traditional centralized cloud or centralized trusted authority usually used for 
bootstrapping cannot be affordable due to the huge number of devices in the F2C 
system. Then, main questions are: “which distributed component must take cloud 
responsibility for bootstrapping devices at the edge of the network?”, “can we apply a 
strategy where the cloud bootstraps fog leaders and fog leaders bootstrap devices in 
their area in a distributed fashion?”  
3.5 Mobility support:  
Secure mobility: Recognized the inherent mobility shown by devices at the edge, the 
main challenge arises when trying to handle secure handover and secure mobility. As 
discussed before, the centralized and remote cloud cannot handle secure mobility for 
distributed devices at the edge of the network, fog leaders closer to the users might do 
so instead. To that end, distributed fog leaders must have secure intercommunication 
among them to provide secure handover for devices on the move. Open challenges are, 
“how does a fog leader hand secure mobility and secure handover for devices on the 
move?”, and “should a fog leader is also on the move, who is providing its secure 
mobility and secure handover”.  
Secure devices joining and leaving:  The centralized cloud providing secure joining 
and leaving for the the huge number of devices in different layers cannot be sufficient 
for F2C systems, due to scalability issues. A hierarchical strategy can be useful to be 
applied here, such as, cloud can manage secure joining and leaving of fog leaders, and 
in parallel, each fog leader can control secure joining and leaving of devices in its area. 
On the other hand, in the F2C system, fog leaders should have secure 
intercommunication among them to provide secure devices joining in another area in 
case of mobility.  
Secure discovery and allocation: All resources, services, and devices must be 
discovered in a secure way. Services must be allocated to resources, previously 
authenticated. Hence, different challenges arise: “how can services and devices be 
discovered in an authenticated secured way in the hierarchical F2C system?”, “how can 
services be allocated to the corresponding authenticated resources securely?”, “are fog 
leaders getting responsibility for securely discovering devices and allocating services 
to authenticated resources in a distributed fashion?”, considering the different 
technologies such as Wi-Fi, zigbee, bluetooth, etc. “which strategy can be applied in 
the F2C system to provide secure discovery for all mentioned technologies?” 
According to these challenges, “can a strategy for resource and service discovery, as 
well as allocation in a secure hierarchical authenticated fashion be re-designed for the 
combined F2C system?” With this idea, fog leaders can get authorization to provide 
distributed secure resources discovery.  
To tackle all the questions and challenges mentioned above, proper security threats 
analysis must be done for the F2C system. Our proposal is then, to re-design a 
hierarchical distributed security architecture for the combined F2C sytem, able to 
provide all the precious identified security.  
  
Table. 2. Main security challenges for F2C-like scenarios 
 
Security Area Challenge Description 
Trust & 
Authentication 
Trust Authentication is mandatory to prevent 
unauthorized users to access the system. 
The authentication mechanism needs 
identity or certificate to be verified and 
give users authorization to be involved 
into the system. Trust can be established 
between components after their 
authentication. Trust is one of the key 
component for establishing security 
between distributed fog nodes. Then, keys 
for encryption and decryption process can 
be distributed for components. Both Keys 
and identities need to be generated as 
unique, updated, and revoked during 
attacks, therefore, in F2C system handling 
key and identity management are the 
bottleneck due to hierarchical nature and 
huge number of distributed low-
computational IoT devices. For 
Authentication and establishing trust, the 
traditional cloud as centralize point 
cannot be sufficient in F2C system due to 
distrusted nature.  Therefore, as the main 
challenge here, trust and authentication 
must be redesigned to be handled in F2C 




Access Control & 
Detection 
Access Control Access control is used to put rules that 
who and what can access the resources. In 
the case, the unauthorized users access the 
resources, intrusion and malicious device 
detection is needed. In case of access 
control and intrusion detection, handling 
the huge number of distributed IoT 
devices and fog nodes is one the main 
challenge in F2C security. Therefore, a 
need rises to re-design access control and 
intrusion detection in distributed way to 
be handled in F2C system 
Intrusion detection 
mechanism 
Malicious IoT and fog 
device detection 
Privacy & Sharing 
Privacy Privacy means that all the user’s private 
information should not be disclosed to the 
others. In F2C system, fog nodes in 
hierarchical way would share their 
resources to users and IoT devices with 
low-computational power to run services. 
In this case, one of critical issues is how 
to handle user’s, IoT devices’, and Fog 
device’s privacy in hierarchical F2C 
system without disclosing any critical 
information about each one of them to 




End-to-end Security  
Network security Providing secure end-to-end 
communication between all components 
in a F2C system is one the challengeable 
issue due to different network protocols, 
huge amount on distributed devices at the 
edge of the network, and hierarchical F2C 
architecture. To provide secure 
communications, initially each one of the 
participant devices in F2C system must 
bootstrap in secure way. Fog nodes can be 
host virtualization environment to run the 
services, therefore, secure virtualization is 
a must at fog layers. All the secure 
communications must be monitored to 
detect any abnormal or malicious 
activities. All fog and cloud providers 
must set agreement to provide secure 
communications between their 
components in F2C system. At the end, a 
most challengeable secure 
communication issue is to design a new 
distributed security architecture to handle 
end-to-end security with less impact on 
the Quality of service. 










Secure mobility In the F2C system, devices such as IoT 
devices, mobiles, cars, etc. are dynamic. 
The devices are on the move. All devices 
arrive to the fog nodes must be securely 
discovered. A device joining in F2C 
system for the first time and even the 
existing device join the fog area must be 
done in secure way. Then, a securely 
leaving fog area to join another area must 
be considering as well. The most 
challengeable secure mobility issues are 
using cloud as single point of failure and 
even bring scalability issues. In 
hierarchical F2C system, a new 
distributed security must be design to 
handle device discovery, joining and 
leaving, mobility, and handover in secure 
way.   
Secure devices joining 
and leaving 
Secure discovery and 
allocation 
 
4 Remarkable Current Efforts and Trends 
Certainly, there are many contributions dealing with security provisioning at cloud and 
recently many contributions came up focusing on the fog arena as well. Undoubtedly, 
the scenario brought in by combining cloud and fog (also including devices at the edge) 
poses several challenges not well covered by current solutions for either fog or cloud. 
However, any potential solution in the area of security must not start from scratch but 
learnt for past efforts in similar fields, what obviously includes efforts in cloud and fog. 
It is not the aim of this paper to go deep into these efforts but rather to highlight 
initiatives working on such a combined scenario and also other notable efforts pretty 
close to the F2C scenario, as briefly illustrated next.  
There are two main ongoing efforts very aligned to the combined fog and cloud 
concept. The OpenFog Consortium (OFC) [8] aims to provide security by embedding 
hardware Root of Trust (HWRT) on the fog nodes. The HWRT can be programmed 
either when configuring (at the factory) or when booting. According to OFC 
expectations this module guarantees security against data breaches, spoofing, and 
hacking by providing secure identification, secure key store, protected operations, 
secure boot, etc. Another ongoing initiative is the mF2C project [9], yet in an early 
stage, theta proposes the use of distributed smart gateways (following a software 
approach) to ease the distribution of credentials and certificates. Thus, when a device 
enters an mF2C area for the first time, the device uses the smart gateway to connect to 
the certificate authority (CA) and gets credentials and certificate. Then, the device can 
establish secure and authenticated communication with the fog leader in that area, 
hence protecting users against man-in-the-middle attack, spoofing, etc.  
Among other references found in the literature not linked to wide ongoing projects or 
initiatives, we may emphasize the work in [15] proposing end-to-end security mobility-
aware for IoT-cloud systems using fog computing. In this work, smart gateways (Fog 
layer) provide device-users-cloud authentication and authorization remotely by using 
certificate-based data transport layer security (DTLS) handshakes. The end-to-end 
security between end users and devices is provided based on session resumption, and 
finally a robust secure mobility is implemented by secure inter-connection between 
smart gateways (Fogs). The solution proposal provides confidentiality, integrity, 
mutual authentication, forward security, scalability and reliability. 
Similarly, authors in [16] propose a new security architecture for combined F2C 
systems, leveraging the use of a centralized F2C controller deployed at cloud and 
several distributed security control-area-units (CAUs) deployed at the edge of the 
network (fog layers) in different areas. Authentication and authorization procedures are 
defined to improve security guarantees. 
5 Conclusion  
This paper aims at highlighting the need to devote more efforts to sort out the large set 
of security concerns inherent to scenarios combining IoT, fog and cloud paradigms. In 
fact, this combined scenario brings together the different security challenges inherent 
to any of each paradigm, setting a complex setting demanding a comprehensive solution 
for security provisioning to guarantee the expected benefits brought in to run apps and 
services. 
The paper introduces security requirements tailored to combined F2C-like systems, also 
analyzing what most sensitive attacks may be and ends up listing the. Main security 
challenges a F2C-like system must deal with to become a reality. 
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